BIND 9.7.2 and automatic DNSSEC signing

BIND 9.7.0 introduced automatic in-server signature re-freshing and automatic key rollover. This allows BIND 9.7, if provided with the DNSSEC private key files, to sign records as they are added to the zone, or as the signatures need to be refreshed. This refresh happens periodically to spread out the load on the server and to even out zone transfer load.

via BIND 9.7.2 and automatic DNSSEC signing | Internet Systems Consortium.

MIT to open up some courses to global audience

MIT to open up some courses to global audience — free, online

The program, called MITx, will represent the next evolution in online offerings, extending the university’s already well-established OpenCourseWare, which provides materials on about 2,100 courses that has been accessed by more than 100 million people. OpenCourseWare will continue, but MITx will be more interactive and provide a greater virtual classroom experience, providing access to online laboratories, student-to-student discussions, and greater interactivity. MIT also expects that MITx will eventually host a virtual community of millions of learners around the world.

 

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Zeus returns: FBI warns of ‘Gameover’ ID-theft malware

The FBI said the phishing lures typically includes a link in the e-mail that goes to a phony website. ”Once you’re there, you inadvertently download the Gameover malware, which promptly infects your computer and steals your banking information,” it warned.

via Zeus returns: FBI warns of ‘Gameover’ ID-theft malware | ZDNet.

Hmmm.  You must have to do something to “inadvertently” download the malware.  I’d like to see this website and how they do it but no link or no example.  This story sounds fishy.

Knock Knock Knockin’ on Bridges’ Doors

In October 2011, ticket #4185 was filed in the Tor bug tracker by a user in China who found that their connections to US-based Tor bridge relays were being regularly cut off after a very short period of time. At the time we performed some basic experimentation and discovered that Chinese IPs (presumably at the behest of the Great Firewall of China, or GFW) would reach out to the US-based bridge and connect to it shortly after the Tor user in China connected, and, if successful, shortly thereafter the connection would be blocked by the GFW. There wasn’t time for a detailed investigation and analysis at the time, but that kernel eventually grew into the investigation detailed below. We were, however, able to determine that limiting connections to the bridge relay to only the single IP expected to be its client would, in fact, block the probes and allow the connection to remain open for an extended period (>48 hours in our testing).

via Knock Knock Knockin’ on Bridges’ Doors | The Tor Blog.